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RISK ADJUSTED DEPOSIT INSURANCE FOR JAPANESE BANKS
ABSTRACT
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the Japanese deposit
insurance scheme by contrasting the flat insurance rate with a
market—determined risk—adjusted rate. The model used to calculate
the risk—adjusted rate is that of Ronn and Verrna (1986) .It
utilizes the notion of Merton(1977) that the deposit insurance can
be based on a one—to—one relation between it and the put option;
this permits the application of Black and Scholes(1973) oodel for
the calculation of the insurance rate. The risk adjusted preniums
are calculated for the thirteen city banks and twenty-two regional
banks. The inter-bank spread in risk-adjusted rates in Japan is
found to be as wide as in the United States. But the insurance
system is only one component of the safety network for a county's
banking system. The difference in the American and Japanese
networks is described and its implications for the evaluation of
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The necessityforpublicinstitutionstobolsterthe
liquidity and the solvency of the commercial banks even in
economies committed to unregulated markets, is recognized by all
but a small minority of scholars committed to tree banking. The
justification offered is that there is a beneficial externality to
the vitality of the banking sector that must be preserved from
contagious runs created by public suspicion of Its solvency.
A recurrent theme in this literature is the consequences of
the support and supervisory responsibilities of the central bank
(as the controller of currency and the lender of the last resort)
overlapping that of thedeposit insurancecorporation. The
American model of deposit insuarance has been widely adopted
elsewhere McCarthy (1980)J, but the system cannot be judged
independently of the nexus of banking relationships. Though the
objective of this paper is the use of Ronn and Verma(1986) model
to rank the city banks and a twenty—two regional banks of Japan by
risk— adjusted insurance premium, we shall begin with a selective
reviewoftheliterature ondepositInsuranceand the
characteristics of the Japanese banking system.
In this context, it is common to differentiate between the
macro—functions(pursuitofmonetarypolicy)andthe
micro—functions (supervision and control of individual banks) of
the central bank. Even though the Insolvency of an individual bank
wouldreduce the money supply by making its deposits llLtquid. it
is in itself no justification of Interfering with the market.
Bentson (1983, p.5) points out that the loses to depositors from
1bank failures were not excessive before the Great Depression. It
was only 0.10 percent of the total deposits per year from 1900 to
1920 and 0.42 percent per annum between 1921 to 1929. Such losses
to liquidity can be rectified easily by a central bank through its
open market operations. Another argument is that insolvencies will
disrupt the payment system and increase the cost of transaction
for the rest of the economy. An Individuals use of the means of
payment has a positive effect on the system as this will
facilitate other people using the same means. The individual will
only consider his private benefit and ignore the greater social
return. Bentson (1983) is skeptical of the argument that the banks
should be given a Pigovian subsidy for the optimal exploitation of
this positive externality. He notes that the use of checks spread
considerably before the introduction of deposit insurance and that
the check anyway carries with it the danger of inadequate funds.
Goodhart(1988, p.102) goes further in arguing: "Monetary payment
services not only could be provided, and are increasingly being
provided, by other collective—Investment funds but could also be
thus provided more safely than by banks".
Another argument that had a wide circulation In historical
literature and has received support In recent theoretical analyses
is that there Is an informational asymmetry which prevents the
depositors from enforcing the normal market discipline on the
banks. Assuming risk aversion, depositors will require riskier
banks to provide a higher return; but they are numerous, small and
possibly ill—educated and do not have the necessary information
which is very expensive to acquire. Ever: brushing aside Eenry
Thonton's comment of bank credit being used by persons of lower
2class as snobbishness of his times, an early advocate of deposit
insurance in New Yorklegislatureput the matter rather eloquently
(quoted in Karekan (1983, p.2)J:
The loss by insolvency of banks generally falls upon the
farmer, the mechanic, and the laborer, who are least
acquainted with the condition of banks and who, of all
others, are most illy able to either guard against or sustain
a loss by their failure.
The informational asymmetry is common to the provision of
many other professional activities Including medical and legal
services. But the special relevance of the problem for banking was
analyzed by Diamond and Dybvig (1983. 1986) and Hirsch (1987).
Commercial banks as financial intermediaries do more than
arbitrage between lenders and borrowers. In the process, they
create a mismatch between the maturities of their assets and their
liabilities. The banks Issue liabilities that are redeemable on
demand but their assets consists of loans to idiosyncratic
borrowers' (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (1989, p.44)1.
The loans have not only longer maturity but are also illiquid in
the sense that they cannot be sold except at severe capital loss
as any hands—off purchaser would discount It for the limited
information he has about the borrower (as compared to the bank).
The creation of the liquidity by the commercial bank makes it
very hard for an individual depositor to evaluate the
soundness of the bank's assets. It is extremely hard to
determine whether the higher returns offered reflect the
greater efficiencies attained by the bank or a trade off for
the higher risk it Is taking [Goodhart(1988, p.64)1.
In the case that the individual suspects the solvency of an
uninsured bank, he has every reason to seek an expeditious
withdrawal of his deposits. This would enable him to receive the
full value of the deposits as against the prorated amount. If this
3opinion is shared by many, then the resulting withdrawal is
adequateto create a liquidity crisis for the bank. Also the
public would at times of suspected crisis show a preference for
lower risk, higher quality and more liquid assets like legal
tender or gold, creating a further need for fire sales of assets
by commercial banks. Banks runs are not the act of frenzied mobs
but the doing of rational individuals (in the economists sense)
with incomplete information [Karekaen (1983, p.4)j.
Technically liquidity crisis must be separated from the
solvency problems. An individual commercial bank with assets whose
equilibrium value (value under normal conditions of sales) well in
excess of its immediate liquidity needs, canrediscount some of
its assets either with other commercial banks or the central bank.
The central bank as the lender of the last resort is responsible
to provide liquidity in times of crisis. One common problem faced
by all central banks is that they have difficulty in separating
the run on an individual bank from run on the system. Federal
Reserve has been criticized for its failure to act decisively and
effectively during the crises of 1920s and 1930s. Recent
criticisms tend to accuse the central banks of being too
solicitous about the solvency of individual banks. A deposit
insurance, by reducing the probability oI o run on the individual
bank, reduces the pressures on the lender of the last resort in
making these awkward choices.
The deposit insurance is not a costless or distortion tree
system. All insurance schemes must be address the twin problems of
adverse selection and moral hazard and various voluntary insurance
programs have devised schemes to classify risks. But schemes to do
4so depend on actuarial estimations of normally occurring events
whose temporal trends are fairly predictable. But bank failures
depend on non—recurring economic trends. Another difference is
that the emphasize in deposit insurance is on avoiding losses due
to insolvency of banks than in compensating the insured for the
losses. The Federal Deposit Insurance System adopted a flat rate
of one—twelfth of one percent with rebates for revenues in excess
of osts so that the actual cost comes to 0.03 to 0.04 percent of
total deposits. The individual deposit covered was increased from
$5000 in 1930s to $40,000 in 1974 and to $100,000 In 1980. Another
characteristic is that the insurance fund of less that 1.2% of
insured deposits maintained by FDIC is far below that would be
considered prudent for a private insurer;itis their public
character and tax—payer backing that make the system credible
[Kane (1986. p.176)].
The flat rate scheme is shown to encourage the banks to take
excessiverisk—takingasitbiases thefirm'srisk—reward
trade—off. The depositors not concerned with the riskiness of the
their deposits, do not demand a higher return from the banks that
undertake riskier investment. But such firms receive a higher
return associated with the higher risk. Relieved from the market
discipline, so the argument goes, the banks as profit maximizers
will seek a higher risk portfolio of assets than they would
otherwise do. This in turn increases the risk of insolvency in the
future and adds to the expected cost of FDIC. To minimize this
distortion, the banks are subject to a number of regulations that
can beclassified under four categories:asset limitations,
capital adequacy, bank holding company permissible activities and
5interestrateceilings[Flannery(1982)forasimplified
exposition[.
Karekan and Wallace (1978) argued that it bank deposit are
Insured under the FDIC—type scheme, then bank regulations were in
a sense necessary. Subsequent discussion led to IdentIfication of
further distortions created by the "implicit" insurance given by
FDIC through their failure—resolution techniques. If the falling
bank is purchased by another bank with the assistance from FDIC
and FRS, then all the deposits are protected to fte full amount
and not to the legal limits. Also the banks could believe, as with
LDC loans, that such protection will be more easily available when
the central bank thinks that the risk is widespread and will
affect the entire banking system. Hence they will have a tendency
to convert as much of their Idiosyncratic risks to systemic risks
[Penatl and Protopapdakls (1988), Spiegel(1989)[.
The deposit insurance is but one component of a network of
supports offered to commercial banks and the Interrelationships
within the network must be taken into account in evaluating the
system. Hence we shall review those features of the Japanese
system that is of Interest to the study of the deposit Insurance.
But what is striking, even to a casual observer, Is that the
Japanese banks are, In contrast to their American counterparts,
unwilling to publicize the existence of a deposit insuarance
scheme.
6II. BANKING SYSTEM AND DEPOSIT INSURANCE IN JAPAN
The modern financial system of Japan Is generally considered
to be the creation of the Meji restoration of 1868 which sought to
transform the economy from the feudal to a modern capitalist
society. The American national banks system was the preferred
model and a large number of national banks with issuing rights
were established (Federation of Bankers Associations of Japan
(1984, p.1)1. This system collapsed by 1882 when the Bank of Japan
became the bank of Issue.
The commercial banks followed the European tian the British
pattern and played an important role in providing long—term
industrial funds. The number of banks Increased to attain a peak
of 1867 in 1901 and then declined rapidly. The minimum bank
capital requirement of the Bank Law of 1927 disqualified halfof
the 1400 banks then existing; most of them preferred amalgamation
with other small and medium sized banks. This brought about the
dualstructure In Japanese banking with the city banks
concentratingonprovidingtonationalcorporationsand
International commerce and regional banks serving the rest of the
country.
On the basis of historical origin, the city banks can be
divided Into four distinct groups(Bronte (1982)1. In the first
group are tour major zaibatsubanksthat had a dominant role In
the Japanese economy till the end of Second World War; they are
Sumitomo, Mitsui, Mitsubishi and Fuji. Six city banks —Sanwa,
7Tokal, Tolyo Kobe, Kyowa, Daiwa and Saltama —wereformed by
amalgamation of regional banks. Dal—Ichi Kangyo and Hokkaldo
Takushoku were the products of privatizatlon of state banks during
the US occupation. Finally the Bank of Tokyo began as Yokohama
Specie Bank, half owned by the Emperor, and changed its name after
the end of the war.
Legally there Is no distinction between city banks and
regional banks. They perform all the functions permitted under the
BankIng Law but they have developed over time certain special
functions, City banks act as "main banks" for large corporations
with whom they maintain close relation. The loans to the
corporations are technically short term but they are regularly
renewed and so are In effect long—term. In addItion they are among
the largest holders of securities of different maturities. They
also assist corporations In times of difficulties.
The regional banks arebased on a prefecture though they
frequently extend their activities to neighboring prefectures. The
lncreaslng economic integration of the country since the Second
World War has provided an Inducement to the regional banks to
expand their activities to the big cities like Tokyo and Osaka.
The regional banks provide services to the local enterprises and
to local governments. They are Important suppliers of funds to the
money markets.
The Japanese banking system Is said to have four distinctive
characterlstlca [Susukl (1980)1. Qverloan is the fundIng of loans
and Investment from sources other than deposits and equity
capital. Part of this is financed by borrowing from the central
bank. While overloans existed from the MeJI restoration, more
8recently it has been a city bank phenomenon; the bank rate In
Japan in post—war years was below the short—term money—market rate
and the banks had no incentive to reduce or repay the central bank
credit. In England and Germany, the penalty rate charged on such
loans provided a price mechanism to restrict their demand; here it
was achieved through credit rationing by the Bank of Japan Suzuki
1980, pp. 12. 57—58)1.
Another characteristic is overborrowing resulting from low
Internal financing and limited issue of securities by the
commercial corporations. Related to this is the propensity of
these corporations to resort toindirect financing defined as
resources provided by financial institutions through the purchase
of securities or other means. In recent years, major corporations
have resorted to a greater use of internal funds than in the
immediate post—war years and their dependence on main banks has
been reduced to that extent. Finally the imbalance of bank
liquidity refers to city banks being short of reserve assets while
regional banks have an excess; as noted earlier, regional banks
are significant lenders In the money market.
The Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Japan have both
supervisory powers over the banks.
The Ministry of Finance acts as the Japanese equivalent of
the US Treasury, the Securities and Exchange Commissions and the
state banking commissions. In so far as it has oversight over the
deposit insurance system, it also has some of the supervisory
powers of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. The bulk of
the Ministry's authority comes from the Banking Law which permits
it to license and supervise all banks. It has powers to approve or
9deny mergers, acquisitions and other changes In the operation of
the bank including the opening of new branches.
The Ministry can enforce its policies in two ways. It can
issue an "administrative guiJance' either orally or written; given
the extensive powers theMinistry of Financehave,the
administrative guidance Is universally obeyed even though it is
not legally binding. Most of the supervisory .powers rest with the
Banking Bureau but the international operations of a bank are
under the oversight of the International Finance Bureau.
The Bank of Japan was established by an act In 1882; some
scholars contend that It was modeled on the National Bank of
Belgium though Goodhart (1988, p.150) questions it. It undertakes
all the standard micro— and macro— functions of the central bank.
Its discount rate is the reference point for most interest rates
in Japan; in 1981 the Bank introduced the new lending facility
similar to the Bundesbank's Lombard rate.
The overloan position of the city banks was mentioned
earlier. Hence the loan policies of the Bank of Japan have a
tremendous impact on these banks and the economy. It also permits
the Bank to use the "window guidance" which sets the bank—by—bank
quotas on customers in periods of monetary restraints. Window
guidance also has no legal basis and again depends on the close
relation between the city banks and the central bank. Recent
financial deregulation, the reduction Inthe dependence of
corporations on bank loans and the rise of postal savings are all
considered to have diluted this interdependence.
The Deposit Insurance Corporation was established in 1971 and
was originally capitalized at 450 millIon yen of which the
10government, the Bank of Japan, the private financial institutions
each contributed one—third. Regular deposits, installment savings
and money in trust with principle guaranteed, are covered by the
insurance originally to an amount of 3 mIllion of yen. Irtterbank
deposits and deposits of Japanese branches of foreign banks are
not covered. Until 1988, the Corporation charged a premium of
0.008 percent of the insured deposits during the previous year. It
can also borrow up to 50 million yen from the Bank of Japan with
the permission of the Ministry of Finance.
On the recommendation of the Committee for Financial System
Research that the deposit insurance system should be strengthened
to maintain orderly credit conditions in the face of financial
deregulation. the following revisions were made in May 1986: (1)
The protection per depositor was raised to 10 million yen; (2) the
premium was increased to 0.012 percent of the deposits; and (3)
the limit on the the borrowing from the Bank of Japan was
increased to 500 million yen and the Corporation was allowed to
borrow from other financial institutions to repay the loans to the
Bank.
The system was tested when the Heiwa Sogo Bank ran into
problems in 1986 and had the potential of being the first bank
failure In fifty years. Sumitomo Bank agreed to absorb all the
uncollectible loans estimated to 170 billion yen. Thus, In
contrast to the rescue efforts in United States In recent years,
neither the Bank of Japan nor the Deposit Insurance System
suffered any loss. However, the difference may be due to the
shadow price that Sumitomo Bank attached to the branches of the
Heiwa Sogo Bank.
11HIrsch (1977, p.243) argues that, due to limitations and
asymmetries of Information, the dependence of well functioning
markets on certain individual behavioral characteristic can be
regarded as a collective intermediate good which will not be
producedinsociallyoptimalquantity by maximizationof
individual welfare. Without implicit or explicit co—operation, the
insurance element in central banking is an example of this type of
markets.
The moral hazard issues can be in theory resolved by one of
the two methods. The central bank can take the English' route of
Inculcating a club arrangement among the commercial banks by which
they receive extra—market facilities in return for submitting to a
paternalistic and moral leadership. The alternate strategy is to a
enforce market discipline by treating equity and large deposits as
deductibles from the insured risk. The cost of this approach is
that the public may believe this rule will not be applied
uniformly to banks of different sizes. They would consider larger
banks to be safer as the central bank will consider their failure
to be disruptive of the entire financial system and will so
intervene in its capacity as the lender of the last resort. Hence
the market would move the system to an oligopoly. Hirsch (1977,
p.252) argues that the predominance of large banks in Germany is
the result of this policy.
The question naturally arises which of these systems prevail
in Japan and what its impact on the deposit insurance system is.
The short survey of the Japanese banking has shown the prevalence
of a small number of city banks that work closely with the Bank of
Japan and subjecting themselves to administrative guidance from
12the Ministry of Finance to an extent unheard of in western
countries. Further the smaller regional banks have a cash surplus
which makes them net lenders In the money markets. Accepting the
argument of Karekan and Wallace (1978) that flat—rate deposit
Insurance will only work in conjunction with administrative
oversight of the banks, it Is reasonable to conclude that the
inefficiencies of not having a risk adjusted Insurance system may
be less in Japan than in a country like the United States. But one
should bear in mind the strurta1 changes taking place in the
Japanese financial system and also the fact that, in spite of the
controls, the }lelwa Sago bank had to be rescued.
III. DEPOSIT INSUARANCE PRICING
While there is unanimity about the sub—optimality of flat
rate premium, there Is less consensus about an alternative. In
general, the various proposals could be divided Into those that
use market information and those that continue to rely on implicit
administrativepricing. Among the market pricing models a
distinction must be made between those that seek to generate ex
ante and ex post risk measures. The literature was reviewed in a
recent FDIC study (1989). The purpose of this paper being the use
of Ronn and Verma(1986) model to evaluate the Japanese deposit
insurance system,we shall confine to &reviewof the option
rIe1ng model of deposit Insurance. Merton (1977) argued that the
pricing of the deposit insurance can be based on the one—to—one
relation between deposit Insurance and put option which permitted
13the application of the Black and Scholes (1973).
if the value of banks assets, V. is greater than the value of
the liabilities to depositors, B. then the depositors will receive
B and equity of the bank Is worth V —B.However, if the asset
value isless than that of the liabilities, then the equity
holders will receive nothing and the insurer will have a net pay
out of B —V.In other words, it the value of assets fall below
that of liabilities, then the bank has purchased a put option to
sell the assets to the Insurer at the value of Its liabilities. If
G(T) is the value to the firm of the guarantee T years from now
when solvency of the firm is evaluated, then
G(O) = MaxiO,B —VI (1)
The followingassumptions are madeISmith(1979)]:(1)
homogeneous expectations ( about the dynamics of the value of the
Insured assets) prevails, with the distribution of the end value
of any finite time integral being lognormal with constant
variance;(2)the constant Instantaneous riskiess rate for
borrowers and lenders isr; (3) capital market is perfect; (4)
trading takes place continuously; and (5) the insured asset
generates no pecuniary or non—pecuniary flows. Then the value of










Hereis the cumulative normal density function. V the current
value of the assets of the firm, a2 the variance rate per unit
time for the logarithmic changes in the value of the assets and B
is the face value of the liabilities at time T. Since most bank
deposits are encashable on demand, a model with term—debt issue is
not strictly valid. Merton, however, argues that the time of
maturity should be equated to the length of time till the next
audit.
The advantage of the formulation Is that the pricing of
deposit insurance is based on five observable variables: (1) the
value of bank assets; (2) the variability of the value of banks
assets; (3) the exercise price as measured by the total amount of
insured deposits; (4) the constant risk free interest rate; and
(5) the time of maturity or lifetime of the option. Like all
models, this one is also dependent on the realism of the
assumptions.
An empirical assessment of risk adjusted deposit Insurance premium
was made by Ronn and Verma (1986). Unlike some earlier studies,
they concentrate on the interbank differences in estimated rates.
The equity of the firm is represented as a call option on the
value of the assets of the firm with the same maturity as that of
the debt of the firm and a striking price equal to the maturity of
the debt. But FDIC does not liquidate a bank when the net worth
becomes negative; rather by an infusion of funds or Purchase and
Assumptions options, FDIC tries to sustain the bank In the
interest of avoiding the disruption created by a bank failure. It
15is assumed that there is a limit to this tolerance of the resource
drain that FDIC exposes itself to and the limit is expressed as a
percentage of the total debt of the bank. Thus when the value of
the bank falls between B and pB, the insuring agency infuses up to
(I —p)B.On the other hand, if the value falls below PB,thenit
takes steps to dissolve the bank.
Given the closure condition, the value of the firm is related









deviation of the return of E.
Under the assumption that all pre—irisurance debt Is of equal
seniority, holders of the debt are entitled to either the future
value of their deposits, or the prorated fraction of the value,





where FV(.) denotes the future value operator, VT Is the terminal
value of the bank at time T, and B1 and B2 are the face value of
16insured and all other debts respectively. The presumption of equal
seniority can be Justified on the ground that the ball—out
practices of the FDIC is equivalent to a de facto insurance of all
debt.
The value of an Insurance Is equivalent to the value of a
put, written with striking price equal to total debt, and then
scaled down by the proportion of demand deposits to total debt,
B1/B where B =B1
+




=dividendper dollar of value of the assets,
paid n times per period
ln[B/V(1 —)l) — 02T12
y= a/T
Itwill be noticed that the per dollar Insurance premium does
not depend on the risk free Interest rate. It Is only the present
value of the striking price that Is relevant for the Black—Scholes
option pricing; here the present value of the debt Is B and so
there is no need to enter the rate explicitly. Second, the insurer
is concerned with the futurestochasticbehavior of assets and the
model does not compare the pre—insurance and post—insurance values
of assets. Finally, the per—dollar premium depends on the total
debt and not on the insured deposits; thls,as pointed out earlier,
is to reflect the policies of the Federal Reserve in protecting
all the creditors of the bank. These assumptions differentiate the
17Ronn and Verma (1986) model from some of the other papers on risk
adjusted insurance models. Deposit insurance based on the option
pricing models suffer from the sensitivity to measurement errors
in the value and riskiness of assets and the misspecification due
to effect of forbearance (supervisory restraint on institutions
that rail soundness criteria).
IV. ESTIMATION OF DEPOSIT PREMIUM FOR THE JAPANESE BANKS
The Ronn and Verma model is applied to determine the premiums
of all the thirteen city banks and selective list of twenty—two
regional banks; no specific scientificcriteria was used in
choosing the regional banks though many of them are among the
largest in this group. Stock market data were gathered from the
Nlkkei Telecom Japanese news and Retrieval on—line database for
the period of January to March 1988. The daIly rate of return were
calculated from• the stock prices for these months; then the
standard deviation of the rate was calculated.Under the
assumption that the daily returns were independently and
identically distributed with normal distribution, the annualized
standard deviation was taken to be /275 tImes the daily standard
deviation. Other financial and accounting data such as the face
value of the total liabilities, the number of shares outstanding
and dividend information were found from the quarterly Japan
Company Handbook (Winter1988) published by the Tokyo Keizai
Shinposa.
We calculated the deposit premium using the equation (5) for
18two values of p In the equation (3). The value of p =0.97was
chosen to compare the results with those In the Ronn and Verma
(1986) paper. p.Itwill be recollected, is a policy parameter and
reflects the willingness of the deposit insurance corporation to
save banks at a loss to itself. To test the Implications of the
conjecture that the Japanese deposit insurance system may tolerate
a higher risk and to check the sensitivity of the results to the
value of the parameter, the rates were recalculated for p =0.94.
The results are given in the appendix, tables 1 to 4.
To evaluate the results, we normalized the premium by taking,
among city banks, that of the Saitama Bank and, among regional
banks, that of the Ogaki Kyoritsu, to be unity. Notice the
absolute values of the premiums of the Saitama Bank and the Ogaki
Kyoritsu are very close to each other when p =0.97but the
premium of the latter is about four times that of the former when
p =0.94.The values of the relative premiums are given In textual
tables I and 2 (pp. 20 & 21). For comparison 12 U.S. banks form
Ronn and Verma (1986) was chosen and similar table prepared for
them and given in table 3 (p. 22)
19Table 1
RELATIVE PREMIUMS OF CITY BANKS
Bank InsuranceRate InsuranceRate
when p =0.97 when p =0.94
Dal—Ichi Kangyo 3.00 0.0803
Nokkaldo Takushoku 1348.33 13.9427









Taiyo Kobe 264.50 3.2038
Saltama 1.00 1.0000
20TABLE 2
RELATIVE PREMIUMS OF SELECT REGIONAL BANKS
Bank InsuranceRate InsuranceRate
when p =0.97 - whenp =0.94
Chiba 1044.9 38.729





Chiba Kogyo 46.0 15.847
Kanto 2274.7 152.411
Tokyo Tomin 672.0 31.137
77 Bank 139.0 14.165
Aomori 845.0 113.744
Yamagata 961.4 38.692









Ogaki Kyoritsu 1.0 1.000
21TABLE 3
RELATIVE PREMIUMS OF SELECT AMERICAN BANKS
Banks Normalized annual
premiums
Continental Illinois Corp. 43.20
Wells Fargo & Co 40.84
Marine Midland Banks Inc 31.22
Manufacturers Hanover Corp.28.20
First Interstate Banccorp. 19.02
Citicorp 9.78
Chemical NY Corp 6.00
Security Pacific Corp. 3.60
Bank of New York, Inc 1.00
Morgan J.P. and Co., Inc 0.02
Source: Ronn and Verma (1986),pp. 892 —893.
22The tables show that, among city banks, Hokkaido Takushoku
and Daiwa Banks have the highest risk related premium. At the
other extreme, Fuji and Mitsui have the lowest. These groupings
are not affected by the change in the value of p from 0.97 to
0.94. The other banks fall in the middle and their ranking change
with the value of the parameter p.
There is even greater instability in the ranking of the
regional banks. The two banks Shizuoka and Suruga, have the lowest
premiums though their relative ranking changes with p. There Is no
invariant ranking of banks with high premiums.
Both in United States and Japan. the interbank variation in
the risk adjusted deposit rate seems to be quite large. It is
reasonable to say that this range is beyond the realm of what is
politically feasible in a democratic society. Also, as pointed out
In earlier studies, the actual numbers seems to be sensitive to
the parameter value assumed and any misspecificatlon of risk.
If the risk adjusted measures are correct indicators of the
riskiness of the banks, then it is clear that the use of a flat
rate could create serious distortions. Yet it is not clear why the
banks with low risk adjusted premiums did not choose a riskier
portfolio for higher returns. On the other hand, if a risk
adjusted deposit premium is Introduced, It is probable that the
banks with the higher premiums would abandon some of the
lnterrnedation they are now doing. Would institutional Innovations
arise In the market to offer these services outside the banking
system or would the economy be adversely affected by the absence
of such services even at higher cost? More fundamentally, if the
23service offered by the banks is the bearing of idiosyncratic risks
which cannot be evaluated by an outsider, can the stock market
correctly measure the aggregate risk born by an Individual bank?
The option pricing model throws a number of challenges to the
study of the safety nets offered by the banks.
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26Bank
E V B d
AI—ICHI KANGYO 024986 0.04061 52701820 455557120.0000018
}OAIDOTAKUSHOKU0.412670.03523987798793255760.0008090
BANKOFTOKYO 0.336950.04219 22648814 204693900.0001268
MITSUI 0.23865 0.04056 23895550 20469390 0.0000008
MITSUDISHI 0.316470.05153 47905920 415318920.0000477
FUJI 0.20785 0.03538 49325348 42284180 0.0000001
SUMITOMO 0.285000.05084 50751376 431485640.0000108
DAIWA 0.44859 0.06895 14500066 126972960.0007815
SWA 0.29639 0.04801 45531512 394287280.0000206
TOF.AI 0.24540 0.03201 30341354 272116860.0000031
KYOWA 0.29883 0,03318 14466365 13267993 0.0000523
TAIYO KOBE 0.33828 0.03979 23419866 21372480 0.0001587





DA—ICEIKAGYO 0.24986 0.04169 51335148 455557120.0000280
XOøIDO TA1CSROK 0.41267 0.03626958719493255760.0048632
BANEOFTOKYO 0.33695 0.04336 22034734 204693900.0008549
MITSUI 0.238650.04163 23281466 204693900.0000128
NITSBISHI 0.31647 0.05290 46660004 415318920.0002802
FUJI 0.20785 0.03631 48056796 422841800.0000021
SUMIToMO 0.28500 0.05217 49456924 431485640.0000798
DAIWA 0.44859 0.07080 14119196 126972960.0022432
SANWA 0.296390.04928 44348124 394287280.0001529
'OKA.I 0.24540 0.03289 29524992 272116860.0000764
OWA 0.29883 0.03412 14068324 132679930.0006425
TAYO KOBZ 0.33828 0.04090 22778578 213724800.0011175
SAITA14 0.27213 0.03168 12014247 113007730.0003488
Tab1e 2: Esti.atiofl of Deposit pre.iofcity banks
when p is 0.94.
28Bank cj V B E
CBIBA 0.42088 0.04723 6537897 6194408 0,0031409
BANKOFYOKORAMA 0.35592 0.0492410733274 9840827 0.0008267
JOVO 0.53471 0.06183 5775213 5455316 0.0062722
GO14A 0.39435 0.05083 3652025 3386084 0.0016425
AHIKAG.A 0.51108 0.05998 5080297 4785281 0.0060809
MUSkSHINO 0.55016 0.04290 1529318 1505252 0.0106917
CR19.9. KOGYQ 025568 0.02150 1277864 1245137 0.0012852
TOKYOT4.IN 0.39519 0.04206 1674750 1592691 0.0025252
0.37859 0.02259 678747 679145 0.0123603
77 BANK 0.31340 0.03218 3011657 2875056 0.0011488
A4ORI 0.39221 0.05076 1202451 1167613 0.0092246
YAMAATA 0.41889 0.04451 1135853 1080776 0.0031373
BANK OF IWATE 0.27223 0.02291 1247225 1230952 0.0042816
TOHO 0.44522 0.04548 1596533 1526766 0.0041384
ROc.AIDO 0.42428 0.03219 2807588 2762080 0.0065700
SHIZUOKA 0.41387 0.05479 5527893 5106311 0.0019317
JUOKU 0.15817 0.01421 2679487 2594373 0.0000635
HOKURIKU 0.27208 0.03205 6219265 6004897 0.0023407
SCRUGA 0.49313 0.05054 2295823 2197072 0.0056178
RACHIJUNI 0.21833 0.03029 4299621 3939244 0.0000190
YAMANASRI 0.44126 0.05893 1381545 1275146 0.0025168
OGAKIKYORITSU 0.20900 0.02275 1909731 1810449 0.0000811
Table4:Estimation of deposit premi of reg.ona1 banks
when p is0.94
29Bank V B d
E
CEB 0.42088 0.04593 6723701 6194408 0.0007314
BN1 OFYOXOHAMA 0.35592 0.0479211028505 9840827 0.0001520
oo 0.53471 0.06014 5938844 5455316 0.0022934
G4A 0.39435 0.04946 3753603 3386084 0.0003656
AHIKAGA 0.51108 0.05834 5223826 4785281 0.0021509
)4SASHINO 0.55016 0.04250 1576923 1505252 0.0031097
CHIBA KOGYO 0.25568 0.02088 1315220 1245137 0.0000322
K.Nro 0.37859 0.02193 699121 679145 0.001593
TOKYO T4IN 0.39519 0.04093 1722498 1592691 0.000474
77 BA 0.31340 0.03128 3097915 2875056 0.0000973
A4OR.I 0.39221 0.03362 1238271 1167613 0.0005915
YAMAGATA 0.418890.04328 1168257 1080776 0.0006730
BAH OF IWAIZ 0.27223 0.01911 1284158 1230952 0.0001011
TOHO 0.44522 0.04421 1642354 1526766 0.0009823
HOAIDO 0.424280.03127 2890448 2762080 0.0010920
SHIzoKA 0.41387 0.05330 5681097 5106311 0.0004908
0.15817 0.01381 2757307 2594373 0.0000001
HOKC.IU 0.272080.03117 6394374 6004897 0.0002730
0.493130.04914 2361717 2197072 00016424
HACHIJOMI 0.218330.02949 4417765 3939244 00000004
YAMANASHI 0.441260.05737 1419803 1275146 0.0007377
OGAIcIKYORITS 0.20900 0.02212 1964045 1810449 0.0000007
Ta1e3:Estisation of deposit premit of regional banks
whenp is0.97
30